19. Jinnah: In Search of Political Power Dinesh Kumar Singh – Indian Political Thought, 2nd Edition

19

Jinnah: In Search of Political Power

Dinesh Kumar Singh

Mohammed Ali Jinnah [1876–1948] is one of the most controversial figures in modern Indian history. He has been contested not only in the country in which he began his political career but also in the country that he founded. India’s collective consciousness and popular imagination still considers him as a villain who was instrumental in creating Pakistan and sabotaging the political idea of a unified country. He started off as a nationalist, advocating constitutional reforms to change the oppressive and divisive policies of the British government. However, after 1937 he propounded the two-nation theory, which held that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations who could not live together. His intellectual journey from the ‘Apostle of Hindu-Muslim Unity’ and hero of ‘Indian Liberation’ to ‘propounder of two-nation theory’ necessitates analysis of his political ideas and his place in Indian history. The present paper attempts to contextualize and analyze critically the political ideas of M.A. Jinnah.

Early Years

Jinnah was influenced by the liberal and secular ideas of Morley, who authored the book, ‘On Compromise’. John Stuart Mill’s greatest disciple, Morley remained Jinnah’s hero. The liberal and democratic ideas of, ‘On Compromise’ ignited Jinnah’s imagination like a flame which emphasized truth first among any choice of principles. He was a Shakespearian hero in modern garb. The noblest imprecations of Burke and Mill stirred his mind and heart.1

Jinnah was fascinated by Dadabhai Nauroji, Pherozeshah Mehta and Gokhale. He joined national movement as a liberal nationalist. In 1906 he attended the Indian National Congress of Calcutta as a secretary to Dadabhai Nauroji. He was thrilled after listening to Dadabhai’s maiden speech which extolled the virtue of free speech. Commenting on the attitude of the British, he told his sister: “If Dadabhai was black, I was darker, and if this was the mentality of British politicians, then we would never get a fair deal from them. From that day I have been an uncompromising enemy of all forms of colour bar and racial prejudice.”2 He strongly defended individual rights and liberties. He excellently advocated nation’s right to self-determination. Without freedom of speech, he felt that any nation would remain ‘stunted’ or wither ‘like a rose bush that is planted in a place where there is neither sunshine nor air.’3

M.A. Jinnah’s vacillating political ideas was tactics to get himself inducted into power structure of the colonial and independent India. In his initial political activity, he believed in a nationalist, secular, modern democratic foundation of the state. But he changed his political thinking to suit political interests. He joined the Muslim League, shifting from Congress, and used the demand of separate electorate and separate Muslim state as a political bargaining tactics to assert himself, politically, under the banner of the Muslim community in the centralized power structure during colonial and post-colonial India. After 1937, he articulated the theory of Muslim separateness. In the beginning of his political career, however, he had rejected the separate electorate principle on the grounds of national principle. But these issues inculcated in him the idea and consciousness of a Muslim identity. His name figured in the list of half dozen Muslim members who were elected for the viceroy’s central legislative council in 1910. He was elected by the ‘non-official Muslim members of the Bombay Legislative Council by five to three votes, eight Muslim gentlemen had decided his fate. This was to be his constituency whose political support he would need in future for his political survival’.4 Taking into account the fears and prejudices of the Muslim groups, he introduced the Wakf (tax-exmpted Muslim endowment) Validating Bill in 1910 to ventilate the grievances of long pending grievances of Muslim community. The colonial government had invalidated gifts of the property of Muslim left in wakfs5. In 1913, he joined the Muslim League.

The annual meeting of Congress and the council meeting of the Muslim League was held in Bankipur in 1912. M.A. Jinnah attended both meeting of Congress and Muslim League. He actively addressed council meeting of the Muslim League and supported a ‘resolution that expanded the League’s goals to include “the attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India’’.6 One member of Council meeting objected to the words ‘suitable to India’. He argued that the meaningless words were inserted into resolution. But Jinnah strongly intervened and supported the insertion of these words ‘to placate the conservative, pro British and anti-Congress majority in the League Council.’7

He was a critic of British rule in India. He believed in constitutional methods for the emancipation of India from the foreign domination. Despite being a Muslim, he had opposed the system of a separate electorate before its constitutional enactment and considered it a threat to the basic tenets of Indian nationalism. Till 1912, he remained the most vocal critic and opponent of the Muslim League’s communal and loyalist politics. Aga Khan, the first elected honorary president of the Muslim League wrote in his memoirs:

“Who was our doughtiest opponent in 1906? A distinguished Muslim Barrister in Bombay, with a large and prosperous practice, Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah… We had always been on friendly terms, but at this juncture he came out in bitter hostility towards all that I and my friends had done and were trying to do. He was the only well-known Muslim to take up this attitude, but his opposition had nothing mealy-mouthed about it; he said that our principle of separate electorate was dividing the nation against itself, and for nearly a quarter of a century he remained our most inflexible critic and opponent.”8

He was opposed to any sort of communalism, whether Hindu or Muslim, and argued that these divisive trends of Indian politics should be discouraged. He realized that the communal difference between Hindus and Muslims was the main challenge to the national liberation movement. The communal politics had no place in his realm of thought. Jinnah advocated the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity as a goal of swaraj. He propagated the principle of nationalism and patriotism at every political meeting from the platform of Indian National Congress. The title of ‘Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity’ was bestowed on him.9 A brilliant and distinguished barrister, Jinnah remained hostile to communal politics of the Muslim League. He considered that all sectarian and communal prejudices were inimical to nationalism. He rejected a separate electorate formula provided in the legislative council reforms which was by proposed by Morley and Minto. Jinnah considered this principle as communal, undemocratic and anti-national. It would pose a challenge to the secular and egalitarian foundations of a modern nation state. He moved a resolution disallowing the proposal for extension of the principle of separate electorates to municipal and local bodies.10

The annual meeting of Congress and the Council meeting of the Muslim League was held in Bankipur in 1912. Jinnah was invited to attend the Council meeting of the Muslim League. He attended the Council meeting as a Congressman and appreciated a resolution of the Muslim League that indicated its broader outlook. He spoke: “the attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India”, to be brought about “through constitutional means, a steady reform of the existing system of administration; by promoting national unity and fostering public spirit among the people of India, and by co-operating with other communities for the said purpose.’’11 Jinnah joined the All India Muslim League in 1913. He was persuaded by Mohammad Ali and Wazir Hasan of Muslim League to sign its membership form. But he declared that his ‘loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.’12

Jinnah strongly believed that the future of the nation would depend on the harmonious relations between the Hindus and Muslims and tried to convince leaders of both communities to device mechanism for collective action on the issue of national liberation movement. At every political meeting from the platform of the Muslim League, he advanced nationalist and patriotic arguments. He marginalized the British loyalist forces and strengthened the nationalist forces within the Muslim League. His patriotic speech changed its ideological character. In the Muslim League meeting of Agra in 1913, he strongly denounced the principle of communal representation and appealed to Muslims that a separate electorate would only divide India into two water tight compartments.13 He started a two-way movement for amicable relations between Hindus and Muslims. In the Karachi Congress of 1913, he seconded a resolution that appreciated the Muslim League for adopting ‘the ideal of self-Government for India within the British Empire.’ He expressed ‘complete accord with the belief that the League has so emphatically declared at its last sessions that the political future of the country depends on the harmonious working and co-operation of the various communities in the country.’14 Speaking from the platform of the Muslim League he asserted: “In its general outlook and ideas as regards the future, the All India Muslim League stands abreast of the Indian National Congress and is ready to participate in any patriotic efforts for the advancement of the country as a whole.”15

Jinnah was the main architect of the pact between the Congress and Muslim League in 1916, and succeeded in convincing both organizations to hold their annual sessions at the same place and time. He was also instrumental in creating unity between the moderates and extremists. He was elected as the president of the Muslim League to lead it on the path of nationalist and patriotic principle. Presiding over the League he asserted: ‘Modern India is fast growing into a unity of thought, purpose and outlook, and is being responsive to new appeals of territorial patriotism and nationality, stirred with new energy and aspiration and becoming daily more purposeful and eager to recover its birth right to direct its own affairs and govern itself.’16 He represented the genuine and authentic voice of nationalism. He believed that India could emerge as a strong and independent national entity only through prior abatement of communal fears, mutual mistrust and discord. He urged Congress to understand Muslim anxieties and override national concern of conceding sufficient quota of elected legislative council seats to Muslims. It would pave the way for convincing Muslim League that joining forces with Congress in articulating a single national set of demands was, in fact, in their own best communal interest.17

‘India for the Indians’ was the central concern of Jinnah’s political thinking. He cautioned the Muslims not to nurture the feelings of mistrust, suspicion and discord against the Hindus. Addressing the Muslim League session in 1917, he suggested to the Muslims: ‘if seventy millions Musalmans do not approve of a measure, which is carried by a ballot box, do you think that it could be enforced and administered in this country? Do you think that Hindus statesmen, with their intellect, with their past history, would ever think of… when they get self-government…enforcing a measure by ballot box? Therefore, I say to my Muslim friends not to fear. This is a bogey, which is put before you by your enemies to frighten you, to scare you away from the co-operation with the Hindus, which is essential for the establishment of self-government. If this country is not to be governed by the Hindus, let me tell you in the same spirit, it is not to be governed by the Mohammedans either and certainly not by the English. It is to be governed by the people and sons of this country.’18

His speeches during this period throw light on his political thinking and the principle of nationalism and patriotism. Presiding over the Muslim League session in 1916, Jinnah asserted: “The whole country is awakening to the call of its destiny and is scanning the new horizons with eager hope.… The Musalmans of India would be false to themselves and the traditions of their past, had they not shared to the full the new hope that is moving India’s patriotic sons today or had they failed to respond to the call of their country. Their gaze, like that of their Hindu fellow countrymen is fixed on the future. But, gentleman of the All India Muslim League, remember that the gaze of your community and of the country is at this moment fixed on you. The decisions that you take in this historic hall, and at this historic session of the League, will go forth with all the forces and weight that can legitimately be claimed by the chosen leaders and representatives of 70 million Indian Musalmans. On the nature of those decisions will depend, in a large measure, the fate of India’s unity, and of our common ideals and aspirations for constitutional freedom.”19

He urged nationalists to take into account the plural character of Indian society and understand the complex problem of communal issue. He appealed to the Congress and the Muslim League to co-operate with each other that required a united and concerted action. He made it clear that ‘united Indian demand, based on the actual needs of the country and framed with due regard to time and circumstances must eventually prove irresistible…. With the restoration of peace the Indian problem will have to be dealt with on bold and generous lines and India will have to be granted her birth-right as a free, responsible and equal member of the British Empire.’20 He suggested to both organizations: ‘formulate a scheme of reforms and do it as far as possible in conformity with the scheme to be formulated by the League and the Indian National Congress. After the scheme had been formulated by the League and the Indian National Congress, they could go to the authorities and say these were the reforms which they demanded in the name of united India.’21

He vehemently criticized British’s shallow and desperate political maxims ‘democratic institutions cannot thrive in the environment of the East’ as baseless, irrational and silly. It affronted the sentiment and feeling of Indian nationalist. He appreciated ‘the living and vigorous spirit of patriotism and national self-consciousness…this pent-up altruistic feeling and energy of youth’ that was visible in various walks of life in India. He argued that ‘the most significant and hopeful aspect of this spirit is that it has taken its rise from a new-born movement in the direction of national unity which has brought Hindus and Muslims together involving brotherly service for the common cause.’22

The Delhi war conference was organized by British in 1918 to enlist the support of Indians in war-efforts. Jinnah confronted Gandhi’s loyalist role on the issue of recruiting Indians for the army. He vehemently criticized Britain’s recruiting drive. He moved a resolution on constitutional reforms linking India’s participation in the war-efforts with British government’s promise for reforms in India. In a telegram to Chelmsford, the Governor General of India, Jinnah asserted: “We cannot ask our young men to fight for principle, the application of which is denied to their own country. A subject-race cannot fight for others with the heart and energy with which a free-race can fight for the freedom of others. If India is to make great sacrifices in the defense of the empire, it must be a partner in the empire and not as a dependency…. Let full responsible government be established in India within a definite period to be fixed by statute with the Congress-League scheme as the first stage and a Bill to that effect be introduced into parliament at once.”23

Governor Willingdon convened the provincial war conference in Bombay in 1918. Willingdon doubted the sincerity of the leaders of Home Rule League in war-efforts. Jinnah criticized British’s hallow assurance given to the Indian nationalists. He commented: ‘I say that if you wish to enable us to help you, to facilitate and stimulate the recruiting, you must make the educated people feel that they are citizens of the Empire and the King’s equal subjects. But the Government does not do so. You say that we shall be trusted and made real partners in the Empire. When? We don’t want words. We don’t want the consideration of matter indefinitely put off. We want action and immediate deeds.’24 Even Gandhi appreciated Jinnah’s political position on British war-efforts. He said: ‘As soon as I set about my task, my eyes were opened. My optimism received a rude shock. We had meetings wherever we went. People did attend, but hardly one or two would offer themselves as recruits. “You are a votary of Ahimsa, how can you us to take up arms? What good has Government done for India to deserve our co-operation?” These and similar questions used to be put to us.’25

Rowlatt Bills were introduced to contain and suppress rising national movement. Jinnah assailed the bill as the ‘Black Bills’. He vehemently opposed the bills and said that ‘no civilized government will accept, no civilized government will ever dream of putting these recommendations in the form of laws.’ In his strongly worded letter of resignation to the viceroy, he considered the imperial Legislative Council as ‘a machine propelled by a foreign executive’ and the bill as ‘obnoxious and decidedly coercive.’26 He was of an opinion that ‘the fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the state, by an over fretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion…a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilized government.’27

The session of the Muslim League and Congress was held in Nagpur in 1920. Gandhi moved a resolution proposing ‘the attainment of swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means.’ The important Congress leaders supported Gandhi’s advocacy of Non co-operation. But Jinnah was the single leader who objected that it was impractical and dangerous to severe connection with the British. He argued that the Non co-operation Movement ‘may be an excellent weapon for the purposes of bringing pressure upon the Government, but…will not succeed in destroying the British Empire.’ He was howled down, ridiculed and hooted. Gandhi’s resolution was passed with ‘deafening, prolonged cheers and applause.’ Commenting on the resolution, Jinnah argued, ‘at the moment the destiny of the country are in hands of two men and one of them is Gandhi…. I appeal to him to pause, to cry halt before it is too late.’28 Colonel Wedgwood, a member of the British Labour Party said that, ‘if India had a few more men of Mr Jinnah’s strength of character, she would be free before long.’29

Jinnah was a champion of civil libertarian, individual rights, liberties and equal justice. He pleaded, on behalf of readmitting the deported editor of the Bombay Chronicle, B.G. Horniman, ‘I do maintain, and I have drunk deep at the fountain of constitutional law, that the liberty of man is the dearest thing in the law of any constitution and it should not be taken away in this fashion.’30

Jinnah was the arch enemy of the British Government. He strengthened the nationalist cause. Despite being in political oblivion, he was an uncompromising nationalist. Raja of Mahmudabad reminisces about his meeting with Jinnah in 1926. He wrote that “he called me to his side and asked me about my studies. Then came the question, ‘what are you, a Muslim first or an Indian first’. To which I replied, ‘I am a Muslim first and then an Indian.’ To this, he said in a loud voice, ‘’My boy, no, you are an Indian first and then a Muslim.”31

Presiding over the All Indian Muslim League session held in 1937, Jinnah succeeded in passing a resolution for complete independence for India. He appealed to Congress for a united front with the League. He argued, ‘What requires is a complete united front and honesty of purpose, and then by whatever name you may call your government is a matter of no consequence so long as it is a government of the people, by the people, for the people.’ Addressing the students of Osmania University, he claimed himself to be a nationalist and a liberator of India. He said that, ‘‘I must assure you that I yield to none in the determination to safeguard the interests of my country, nor would I yield to anybody in striving for the attainment of freedom for my country. I am essentially a practical man, I have been in practical politics for over a quarter of a century. The words ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Nationalist’ have undergone many changes in their definition and significance. Some people have a dictionary of their own, but within the honest meaning of the term, I still remain a nationalist.’’32

Religion, State and Secularism

Jinnah was called the Muslim Gokhale. He considered the issue of Hindu-Muslim unity a necessary for the attainment of swaraj. He opposed communal, parochial and sectarian politics. In the Calcutta Congress of 1906, he moved an amendment to the official resolution that had provided for reservation of seats in the legislatures and administrative service. He argued, ‘I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the Mohammedan community should be treated in the same way as the Hindu community. The foundation upon which the Indian National Congress is based is that we are equal, that there should be no reservation for any community.’33

He worked hard to bring the two communities together. He argued that the ‘salvation of India lies in the true union of the people and her onward march of progress depends upon the constitutional and constructive methods.’ Addressing the Muslim students in 1915, he said ‘one of the chief objects should always be co-operation, unity and goodwill not only among the different sections of Mohammadans but also between Mohammadans and other communities of the country.’34 Jinnah advocated the cause of the Muslims before the Hindus, and of the Hindus before the Muslims. He wanted to create goodwill and remove misunderstanding between two communities for co-operation in the larger interest of national liberation movement. He observed that, ‘all thinking men are thoroughly convinced that the keynote of our real progress lies in the goodwill, concord, harmony and co-operation between the two great sister communities. The true focus of progress is centered in their union…. But the solution is not difficult…’35

Jinnah wanted to achieve unity and co-operation between Hindus and Muslims to produce a force which no power on earth could resist. He appealed to the Muslims to co-operate with the Hindus. He suggested them to develop virtue of self-reliance and patriotism. He also urged the Muslim League not to insist on the principle of separate electorate. He appealed … ‘to my Hindu brethren that in the present state of position they should try to win the confidence and the trust of the Muslims, who are, after all, in the minority in the country. If they are determined to have separate electorate, no resistance should be shown to their demands.’36 The issue of Muslim representation was a minor problem which should not be allowed to come in the way of unity and co-operation between the Hindus and Muslims. It would pave the way for an emergence of a strong national unity. He believed that the main issue was, ‘transfer of power from the bureaucracy to democracy’, and all attention and energy should be concentrated ‘…on this question alone’. ‘Hindus and Muslims united and firm…will produce a force which no power on earth can resist.’37

Jinnah, in his presidential address of the Muslim League conference in 1916, argued that the future of the nation lied in the harmony and goodwill between the Hindus and the Muslims. He said that, ‘towards the Hindus our attitude should be of goodwill and brotherly feelings. Co-operation in the cause of our motherland should be our guiding principle. India’s real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relation between the two communities.’ He insisted both communities to rise above the parochial and sectarian prejudices. He appealed to Muslims that, ‘We should not lose the sympathy of our well-wishers in India and England by creating a wrong impression that we, as a community, are out only for self-interest and self-gain. We must show by our words and deeds that we sincerely and earnestly desire a healthy national unity. For the rest, the 70 million of Mussalmans need not fear.’38

Jinnah considered that the Hindu-Muslim unity was the foundational basis of the patriotism and national self-consciousness. He hailed that the united front of Hindu-Muslim would promote the living and vigorous sprit of patriotism and national consciousness. It would the pave the way for a strong national unity. He believed that Swaraj cannot be achieved without ensuring the political unity between Hindus and Muslims. Swaraj was almost an interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity. That would be, ‘more than half the battle won for a responsible government.’ He said, ‘the advent of the foreign rule and its continuance in India is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly, the Hindus and Muslims are not united and do not sufficiently trust each other. The domination by the bureaucracy will continue so long as the Hindus and Muslims do not come to a settlement. I am inclined to say that India will get a Dominion Responsible Government the day the Hindus and Muslims are united. Swaraj is an almost interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity.’39

After non-co-operation movement, Jinnah was branded as a communalist. Jinnah was still considered a Muslim Maizzini, ‘whose nationalism was not swallowed either by conceit or communalism’.40 He strongly advocated the formulation of common demand for both communities. At his initiative, all parties’ conference of the Muslim League and the Congress was organized in Delhi in 1927, for ensuring unity between them. He suggested the Muslims to abandon the system of a separate electorate and adopt the mixed electorate under certain conditions of mutual give and take. For him, the question of separate or mixed electorate was more of a question of methods and means to an end. Jinnah asserted that, ‘Mussalmans should be made to feel that they are secure and safeguarded against the Hindu majority during transition period.’ Jinnah was not enamored by separate electorate although the overwhelming majority of the Muslims believed that this system would not retard the growth and development of representative government. He also suggested the Hindus to agree on fair and reasonable constitutional safeguards, which alone could remove Muslim suspicions. He was in favor of negotiating an equitable sharing of power between Hindu and Muslim at central and provincial levels. He believed that all community should share the fruits of liberty equally. His central concern was how to give a real sense of confidence and security to the minorities.41

The British government wanted to leave Jinnah high and dry at the time of Simon Commission. He advocated forging a united front between Hindus and Muslims to boycott the Commission. He thwarted the policy of divide and rule and tried to ‘unite and get self-rule.’ Jinnah, though criticized by communal Muslims and branded as a communalist by the Hindus, challenged the communal leaders of both community not to divide the people on communal lines and disturb the harmonious relations between them. He argued, ‘I warn those who want to exploit Mohammadans to leave off their dirty game…. I appeal to you Hindus not to pass your judgment on the Muslim community prematurely. Do not doubt or blame them. I appeal to you, the major community to be true to your faith, and if you do that, let me tell you that the minor communities including the Muslims will follow you.’42

Reacting to Motilal Nehru’s report which advocated a joint electorate without sufficient safeguards for the Muslims, Jinnah declared that the minorities must have a complete sense of security before its broader political sense could be evolved for co-operation and a united endeavour in the national tasks. He argued that ‘majorities are apt to be oppressive and tyrannical’. He considered the constitutional safeguards and security of the Muslims were a requisite condition for ensuring the political unity between both communities. Speaking as a spokesman of India and not Muslims, he stressed the resolving vexed and complex problem of minorities. He pointed out that ‘the two major communities in India are Hindus and Mussalmans and naturally, therefore, these two communities have got to be reconciled, united and made to feel that their interests are common and they are marching together.’ He put forward his famous, Fourteen Points which included problems of minorities, issue of a separate electorate and the power of the provinces. He cautioned, ‘if you do not settle this question today, we shall have to settle it tomorrow, but in the meantime our national interests are bound to suffer.’43

Jinnah viewed the Hindu-Muslim unity as ‘sine qua non’ of the future constitution. A constitution would be successful if it provided a comprehensive sense of security to the Muslim community. He argued that ‘no constitution will ever receive the support of the minorities unless they can feel that they, as an entity, are secured under the proposed constitution.’ At the Second Round Table Conference he said, ‘I am an Indian first and a Muslim afterwards. But at the same time I agree that no Indian can ever serve his country if he neglects the interests of the Muslims.’ Unity and an honourable settlement between both communities was pivot upon which national selfgovernment for India could be constructed and maintained.44

Jinnah represented the aspirations and interests of the Muslim elite. Jinnah’s main concern was to protect the interests of upper middle classes (aristocratic-feudal and western educated) and capitalist classes of Muslim community. He was articulating communitarian interest of upper classes such as separate electorate, reservations and weightages. He was not concerned with social, economic and religious rights of lower classes. As Moin Shakir argued that the response of lower and upper classes of the Muslim society to colonialism stood in sharp contrast to each other. The political thinking of the lower classes was entirely different from political thinking of Muslim elite. He further opined that ‘the upper classes, even if they happened to be losers in consequences of the colonial policies, did not join hands with the aspirations of the lower classes. The reasons were many: absences of any contact with the lower classes, perception of cultural values and historical identity, great desire to have a share in jobs and the political imperatives to find out the ways and means to strike a compromise with the ruling powers.’45

Jinnah’s conceptualization of nationalism and democracy was based on the ideology of the bourgeoisie. His notion of nationalism seems to be hegemonic from the perspectives of poor Muslims. Gramsci, through the twin concepts of ‘national-popular’ and ‘hegomonic’, discussed forging communality of purpose and of programmes among people differently located within the power structure in the national context. Gramsci argued that class rule was to be transformed into a national one through the active and collaborative consent of masses. For him, hegemony ‘…is a system of alliances which enables it to mobilize the majority of working population.’46 Seen from this perspective, Jinnah’s notion of nationalism articulated the demand of upper classes of Muslim community. These demands were articulated in such a way to make it appear as the demands of poor classes of Muslim community.

The image of the minority reflected in colonial, orientalist and nationalist discourse was viewed as rigid, codified, unchanging and close to external influences. Indian religion was considered by them as Hindu religion. They viewed Indian culture as vedic culture. This construction could be ‘harnessed for the purpose of creating solidary political communities in a context where contestations over power were becoming central.’47 Jinnah’s articulation of interests of minority emanated from elitist perspectives. He was articulating communitarian interest of Muslims. He urged Congress and its notion of hegemonic nationalism to create space for Muslims in the public domain. Mushirul Hasan maintained : ‘the notion of a Muslim minority, as reflected in the colonial and nationalist discourse, flowed from a certain understanding of the Muslim communities in South Asia and their perpetuation by the Muslim elites to legitimize their own claims.’48

Secularization of Muslim Politics

Jinnah was nationalizing and secularizing communal Muslim politics. He was opposed to provincialization of national politics. He criticized the interference of the communal and obscurantist principles in the domain of public sphere and civil society. He advocated for the creation of secular and democratic society. He upheld the liberal, egalitarian and human value system. Jinnah was critical of religious orthodoxy and sectarian views of the priestly classes of both communities. He argued, ‘I think I have a solution for the Hindu-Muslim problem. You destroy your orthodox priestly class and we will destroy our Mullahs and there will be communal peace.’49

A perusal of his speeches throws light on his notion of secularism. He was of the view that communal politics of Muslim League should be secularized and nationalized. He argued that communal and sectarian politics of hatred and intolerance would undermine the liberal space and secular fabric of the society and the polity. He rejected separate electorate formula provided in the legislative council reforms in 1908. Jinnah viewed this principle as communal, undemocratic and anti-national. It ran counter to the core principles of the secular and egalitarian foundations of a modern nation state. He stated, ‘these measures are bound to create in the public body, feelings of race and religious animosities dangerous to peace and contentment; and in the legislature itself a spirit of faction which will mar the utility and lower in public esteem the character of the Legislative Councils.’50

He considered that the mixing of religion and politics might help the non-cooperation movement initially, but would inflict incalculable damage to national interests of India. He rejected ‘pseudo-religious approach to politics’ injected by Gandhi. He deplored the khilafat agitation which had brought the reactionary mullah element to the surface. He warned Congress leaders that this movement would encourage the pan-Islamist sentiment and buttress tottering empire of the Sultan of Turkey. It would dilute secular and nationalist spirit of the Indian Muslims. He abhorred the deep religious colouring of the movement. He called it ‘an essentially spiritual movement’ based on destructive methods which did not take the human nature into account.51

Jinnah strongly advocated social reforms. He opposed sectarian ideologies, caste and gender hierarchies and inhuman value system. He criticized the institutionalized inequality of caste system. He wanted to create the society which would be free from shackles of orthodoxy and obscurantist principles. He strongly supported ‘Hindu Marriage Validity Bill’ which intended to liberate Hindus from shackles of caste orthodoxy. He argued, ‘are you going to deny liberty to those whom you have trained on western ideas, and are they to remain the victims of this caste shackles?…. I am as much interested, my Lord, in coming to rescue of Hindu minority suffering today because of this law as anybody else would be interested in coming up to the rescue of a Mussalman minority if it was suffering.’52

Jinnah considered human liberation from social and religious bondage as an important component of democratic transformation of the society. He advocated the eradication of evil practices prevalent in the Indian society. He favored the extension of the The Sharda Bill, which originally aimed at forbidding Hindu child marriage, to bring Muslim girls under its purview. He repudiated Mullah’s argument that it ran counter to the basic principles of Islamic injunctions. He claimed himself as a representative of India not Ulema. Jinnah condemned orthodoxy ideologies prevalent in Hindu and Muslim religions which sanctioned cruel, horrible and disgraceful inhuman practices. He felt that backwardness of the Muslims would retard not only the development of the community but would also handicap and injure the national interest of India.53

Jinnah repudiated Congress’ claim that it represented the entire nation and did not care about Muslim communities. He argued that any future constitutional structure must protect and safeguard the position and interest of the Muslims. This demand of Muslims did not go against the basic principles of secularism. Muslims stood shoulder to shoulder with Hindu communities and did not lag behind in their patriotic co-operation with Hindus. He asserted that ‘it may appear to any amateur politician that such demand savours of communalism, but in reality to those who understand the political and constitutional history of the world, it must be evident that it is not only natural but is essential by ensuring it whole-heartedly and the willing co-operation of the minorities who must be made to feel that they can rely upon the majority with a complete sense of confidence and security.’54

Even after establishing Pakistan on the basis of two nation theory and religion, he wanted a modern, liberal, secular and democratic state. Delivering presidential address to the constituent assembly of Pakistan, he talked about an inclusive and impartial government, religious freedom, rule of law and equality for all. He also argued for separation of religion and state. He assured the minorities, i.e., non-Muslims that they would be treated on the basis of equality of mankind. He argued that the minorities would ‘enjoy fullest security of life, property and honour.’ Muslims and non-Muslims would be treated on an equal footing. He further argued that the new state would ‘function with the will and sanction of the entire body of people in Pakistan, irrespective of caste, creed or colour.’55

Jinnah was not sure about what the ultimate shape of the constitution of Pakistan was going to be, but he visualized Pakistani polity to be structured on democracy and Secularism. Commenting on the future constitution he declared: “I am sure that it will be democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam…. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state…to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christian and Parsi but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.”56

Due to the untenable proposition of two nation theory, Jinnah discarded it. He reverted back overnight and changed his political thinking for political expediency. He argued that Hindus and Muslims were not two nations but were two communities. Speaking on the first session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, he asserted: ‘You are free; you are free to go to your temple, you are free to go to your Mosques or any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state…. Now I think, we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because, that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense of the citizens of the state.’57

Jinnah’s speech in Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947, throws light on the nature of the Pakistani state. The father of Pakistan had dreamt of a secular state which would guarantee every citizen’s freedom to practice his or her religion but the citizen shall not be discriminated by the state on the basis of religion, race and caste. He argued, ‘If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. I cannot emphasize it too much. We should to begin work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community-because even as regards to Muslim you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on – will vanish.’58

Jinnah advocated the modern notion of state, constitutionalism, civil and political rights and equal citizenship. Occasionally he held the opinion that this modern structure should be in consonance with Islamic civilization. Delivering an inaugural speech in the Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947, he maintained: “The constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future Constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete Sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. We have to do the best we can… dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasize is this-remember that you are now a Sovereign Legislative body and you have got all the powers. It therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions.”59 He argued that the issue of framing of constitution and the form of government would be decided by the people and their representatives. Jinnah, at the Muslim League session of Delhi in 1943, declared: “The constitution of Pakistan can only be framed by the millat and the people… The constitution and the government will be what the people will decide. The only question is that of minorities.’60

Jinnah envisioned that democratic Pakistani polity must be structured on the pattern of Islamic tradition and civilization. He argued that the financial system of Pakistan must be in consonance with Islamic principles. On the opening ceremony of the state bank of Pakistan, Jinnah maintained: “We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”61

Jinnah argued in a very unambiguous term that Pakistani democratic state would be guided by the principle of Islam. Muslim would be the ideology of Pakistan. He clarified, ‘Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in close association with us all those who, of whatever creed, are themselves willing and ready to play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan.’62 He was trained in liberal and modernist tradition. He was influenced by the liberal and secular ideas of enlightenment thinkers. But gradually he changed his ideological positions. He believed that the principles of Islam and modern democratic and economic system are compatible. One can see the apparent contradiction in Jinnah’s political thought. His changing political philosophy was a result of the prevailing separatist and fundamentalist politics in colonial India and post-colonial Pakistani society. He was under the pressure of the fundamentalist and essentialist Islamic ideas. Rahmat Ali criticized Pakistan movement because it had not been enunciated in consonance with his plan. He maintained: ‘The blackest treachery has been committed against the Millat…. In accepting the British plan Mr. Jinnah has acted the judas and bartered and dismembered the Millat…his crime is too black to be whitewashed…its consequences are too calamitous to be forgotten by the Millaat…his attempts are too crude to deceive history.’63 Maulana Abul Maudooddi criticized the politics of Muslim League and Muslims belonging to Congress. He considered the Jinnah’s politics as devoid of Islamic goal and Islamic spirit. It did not aim at establishing a religious state.64

Jinnah argued that the principle of Islam was inherently compatible to democracy. The world view of Islam is based on the principle of equality and brotherhood of man. It is non-discriminatory in nature. But his politics was not concerned with the Islamic notion of democratic equality and brotherhood. Jinnah and his Muslim League represented the interests of aristocratic-feudal and capitalist elements of Muslim society. They rarely addressed the issue of the religious, cultural and social rights of the community in colonial India. The process of Islamization accelerated this process. It bridged the gap between the upper and lower strata of Muslim community. Moin Shakir argued that the politics of Jinnah and Muslim League and the aspirations of Muslim elite ‘shaped the consensus of the Muslim masses and the Ashrafs of the community.’ The political thought of Jinnah represented ‘the basic characteristics of this emerging political situation.’65

Jinnah’s politics repudiated the Islamic notion of equality. Abul Azad urged Hindus and Muslims to think ‘as a peasant or zamindar, or a labourer or a capitalist, and so on…. It will be worth nothing unless it reflects equality of opportunity and economic freedom for all.’66 Commenting on the relationship between liberal democracy and Islamic religion, Michael Minkenberg said: “…Democracy has core meanings which some religions may have problems in accepting, that at any point in time religions have dominant discourses which constrain some of the many voices within a particular tradition, and that religion is not completely irrelevant to political outcomes.”67 Jinnah was a westernized and liberal political thinker. But his politics was elitist in essence. He was incapable to contain the fundamentalist discourse of Islamic religion which repudiated the compatibility of religion and principles of democracy. They promoted the politics of majoritarianism which negated the aspirations of different cultural, linguistic and regional groups. As Sudipto Kaviraj argued that majoritarianism is inimical to democratic principle.68 Jinnah’s politics did not address problems of Pakhtun, Baloch or Sindhi identity. Ayesha Jalal argued that an unending ideological struggle between Muslim exceptionalism and Islam’s universalism resulted in the generation of new political currents which narrowed the concept of nation. Nation was identified with the larger ‘Umma’. She further maintained that the institutional politics dominated by modernist Muslims did not involve poor and lower classes Muslims who had already been swayed by the fundamentalist ideas.69

Jinnah’s formulation would be valid in Muslim society when egalitarian discourse of Islamic religion prevails over separatist element. The authoritarian, feudal and militarized character of Muslim polity, fundamentalist politics and dogmas of institutionalized Muslim religion discredited egalitarian principle of Islam. It was projected to be incompatible with liberal democratic ideas. This led Samuel. P. Huntington to theorize ‘clashes of civilizations’ which would result in conflicts between Islam and Christianity.70 Postcolonial scholars have pointed out inherent fallacy in his formulation which viewed the contradictions of international politics in religious terms.

Two Nation Theory

After 1937, Jinnah’s politics took a different course. He enunciated the, “Two Nation Theory” to advance the interests of Muslims after the British’s withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent. The partition of India caused catastrophic and untold misery for both Hindus and Muslims.

The “Two Nation Theory” had germinated much before Jinnah. The late 19th century witnessed the evolution of this theory. Muslim modernist and reformer, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan started the movement for self-awakening and identity. He established the Aligarh Muslim University. This university was one of the centres where the idea of Pakistan was conceived and germinated. The famous poet and philospher, Muhammad Iqbal’s presidential address to Muslim League on 29th December 1930 at Allahabad is considered as the first articulation of the two nation theory. He talked about it in very vague and uncertain terms. He said: “I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state, with self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-Western Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-west India.”71

Rahmat Ali was the first person who publicly articulated this theory and produced a clear-cut plan. A definite shape to an idea of Pakistan was given by him. He coined the word Pakistan. He ignited the imagination of Muslim community. He, in a pamphlet, ‘Now or Never’, issued in 1933 from Cambridge, proposed that the Punjab, N.W.F.P. (Afganistan), Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan be separated from India and formed into a federation of their own.

Jinnah translated his two nation theory into the political reality of a nation state. He argued that the Muslims of the subcontinent were separate and a distinct nation from the Hindus. He wanted to negotiate a constitutional arrangement based on equitable sharing of power between Congress and Muslim League, representing Hindus and Muslims respectively. Congress insisted on the unity of the nation and refused to share power at British India’s unitary centre. It paved the way for the articulation of two nation theory by Jinnah and partition of India.72 Rebuking Congress’s intransigencies at annual session of the League at Patna, he considered it ‘a misfortune of our country, indeed it is a tragedy, that the High Command of the Congress is determined, absolutely determined, to crush all other communities and culture in this country, and to establish Hindu Raj.’ He further argued ‘I say the Muslims and the Muslim League have only one ally, and that ally is the Muslim nation.’73

Even before 1940, the idea of Pakistan was in his mind. He did not discuss the idea of a separate state with anybody. He used his demand of a separate Muslim state as a political bargaining power to assert the interests of the Muslim in the power structure. He was competing with the Congress to be inducted in the power structure. In 1938, after the refusal of a Muslim representation in the provincial cabinet by the Governor of Bombay, he conveyed his ideas to the editor of the Times of India, ‘This means that we, of the Muslim League, who represents the Muslims are to have no further say in the government of this province or of any other province in India where Congress is in majority. That is the end. There is nothing more to do except to get a state of our own for the Muslims of the country.’ He argued that Congress had created ‘a serious situation which will break India vertically and horizontally.’74 Despite the advocacy of partition of India by colleagues and followers, he was reluctant to forcefully articulate “two nation theory” and use it as a bargaining tactics to derive power from the Congress. It showed political opportunism of M.A. Jinnah as he tried to get properly placed in the power structure.

Jinnah, in his article in ‘Time and Tide’ on January 1940, argued that the Muslim League was opposed to the domination of Hindu majority over Muslim and other minorities and vassalization of Muslim India. He vehemently opposed any federal arrangement which may result in domination of majority community over minority under the guise of parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary democracy is not sensitive to concerns and problems of the minorities. India is a pluralist and multi-national society. This system is totally unsuited to the genius of the people of the country which is composed of various nationalities. He argued that the Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations. He said: “A plan of action must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations, but both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a constitution, the Muslims are ready to co-operate with the British Government, the Congress or any other party so that the present enmities may cease and India may take its place among the great countries of the world.”75

Jinnah presided over the second session of the Lahore Muslim League in 1940. He was instrumental in passing famous resolution which called for a separate Muslim homeland. It was considered as the intellectual bedrock of Pakistan. It did not mention the two nation theory. It stated, “that it is considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent unit shall be autonomous and sovereign.”76

Lahore resolution called for a separate Muslim homeland in vague and uncertain terms. It did not use the word Pakistan. The Indian and British press considered it as ‘vivisection of the motherland,’ ‘dividing the baby into two halves’ and ‘cutting the cow’. Congress leaders attacked him in a very derogatory language. He was branded as anti-Hindu. Reacting on these attacks, he argued: “we had not used the word ‘Pakistan’. Who gave this word …. You know perfectly well that Pakistan is a word which is really foisted upon us and fathered on us by some sections of the Hindu Press and also by the British Press. Now our resolution was known for a long time as Lahore Resolution, popularly known as Pakistan. But how long are we to have this long phrase? I now say to my Hindu friend and British friends: we thank you for giving us one word.”77

Jinnah stated that Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different religious philosophies, with different social customs and literature, with no intermarriage and based on conflicting ideas and concepts. Their outlook on life and of life was different and despite one thousand years of history, the relations between the Hindus and Muslims could not attain the level of cordiality. Delivering a political speech, he argued: “It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They neither intermarry nor dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspect on life and of life is different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state.”78

Jinnah held that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. He argued that Muslims were separate nations because of their distinctive culture and civilization, language, and literature, art and architecture. He asserted: “We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test as a nation. We are a nation of hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proposition, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions: in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.”79

He considered religion as the basis of nation. He argued, “Religion alone is a cohesive force for the idea of a nationality. In countries where the allegiance of people is divided on the basis of religion, the idea of a single nationality has never finally succeeded. In Germany, the Christians and Jews have lived together for centuries and yet failed to weld together into a single nation.”80 For rationalization of his two nation theory he argued that they are not simply religions, but a distinct cultural and national community. He asserted, ‘Religion is considered not merely religion, in the strict sense as understood in the West by a Hindus or a Muslim but a complete social order which affects all the activities of life. In Islam, religion is the motive spring of all actions in life. A Muslim of one country has far more sympathies with a Muslim living in another country than with a non-Muslim living in the same country…. Even now an Indian Muslim feels far more stirred by the distress of his Muslim brothers beyond India than by a similar calamity affecting non-Muslims in India.’81

The Congress was ready to partition Punjab and Bengal as the price for acquiring centralized state power. The British colonial power was eager to quit with the least possible damage to imperial interests. Ayesha Jalal argued that the demand for the partition of India was a colossal miscalculation. These prevailing conditions compelled Jinnah to acquiesce in the creation of the very ‘maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten’ which he had rejected in 1944 and again in 1946.82 Jinnah and his Muslim League were representing the aristocratic, feudal and capitalist elements of Muslim community in colonial India. He did not involve lower classes of Muslim society. Jinnah was using demand of a separate Muslim state as a political bargaining power to assert the voice of the Muslim community in the centralized state structure of sovereign India. Islamic religion was used by him to conceal the linguistic and regional diversities of Indian Muslims.83 The urgent task of nation-building of Pakistan foregrounded the hidden internal differentiation of Muslim community. Instead of Islam, different issue had to be devised for nation-building.84

It is not an accident that Jinnah changed his thinking and articulated two nation theories. The national movement and its principal articulators, the Congress articulated the interests of the upper sections, zamindars and capitalists. The Congress’s exclusive nationalism was instrumental in projecting ‘Islamised and exclusive image of the Muslim middle and upper classes.’ Muslim zamindars and capitalists patronized and supported the Muslim League and Jinnah. Jinnah asserted his domination over Bengal Muslim politics by ousting his rival political leaders with the help of Ispahanis, a Calcutta based leading Muslim capitalist. Ispahanis and Adamjee financed the Muslim League papers, Stars of India and Dawn. Jinnah helped in starting a Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce and Industry and planning Muslim banks and an airline company. The Muslim League assured, ‘the hedging off of a part of India from competition by the established Hindu business groups or professional classes so that the small Muslim business class could thrive and the nascent Muslim intelligentsia could find employment.’85 The similar type of view on the Hindu line was expressed by G.D. Birla in his letter to Mahadev Desai in July 1942. He wrote: ‘You know my views about Pakistan. I am in favour of separation, and I do not think it is impractible or against the interests of Hindus or of India.’86

Maulana Azad noticed the inherent fallacies in Jinnah’s formulation of two nation theory. He argued that Muslim had been an equal partner with Hindus in shaping composite culture of India. Delivering the Presidential lecture of the Congress in 1940, he maintains:

“It was India’s historic destiny that many human races and cultures and religious faiths should flow to her, and that many a caravan should find rest here….One of the last of these caravan was that of the followers of Islam.

Full eleven centuries have passed by since then. Islam has now as great claim on the soil India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been the religion of people here for several thousand years, Islam has also been their religion for a thousand years….

Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievement. Our language, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our manners, and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavour. There is indeed no aspect of our life, which has escaped this stamp.”87

The two nation theory is beset with theoretical fallacy and a lot of problems. Benedict Anderson, in his ‘Imagined Communities’ in 1983, rejected conventional conceptualization of nation which considered it as product of given sociological conditions such as language, race and religion. He viewed it as an ‘imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’ Imagination played an important role in the conceptualization of nation. His book engendered new theoretical ideas on nationalism.88 In 1983, Salman Rushdie’s novel, ‘Shame’ dealt with society, culture and religion of Pakistan. He said: “Pakistan may be described as a failure of the dreaming mind…perhaps the place was just insufficiently imagined.”89 The insufficient imagination of Pakistan has created enduring pathologies and self-inflicted injuries in Pakistan. Rushdie’s theoretical insight is ‘not just pithy and inventive; it is also largely correct.’90

Jinnah’s formulation of a nation rehabilitated as one of the religious collectivities at the centre as the hegemonic collectivity. It relegated others to periphery and marginalized them. The claim that Pakistan were or are Muslim homelands is untenable in a multicultural society because religious identity cannot define nativity and nationhood. Pakistan is as much the homeland of non-Muslims living in that region. Second, Indian sub-continent is a multicultural society. Jinnah’s theory talked about the commonality of religious identity and relegated linguistic, cultural and regional diversities to background. It could not bind Pakistan on the basis of common religious identity. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 falsified the Two Nation Theory. Third, the Muslims migrated to Pakistan and Bangladesh from India. Indian Muslims in Pakistan were called as the Mohajirs. They were accepted as nationals and treated as outsiders. This clearly shows the antidemocratic tenor of religious nationalism. Fourth, despite the migration of population on a large scale during partition, India is home of the largest Muslim population in the world. After partition, a third of the Muslims lived in West Pakistan, a third lived in East Pakistan, and a third decided to stay back in India. This shows the untenable proposition of two nation theory. Fifth, multicultural society of Pakistan is not free from linguistic conflicts. The different linguistic groups-Punjabis, Sindhis and Baluchs are demanding their share in polity of Pakistan.91 Stephen Cohen pointed out the inherent fallacies of Jinnah’s formulation.92 Quoting Altaf Hussain, he argues: “The idea of Pakistan was dead at its inception, when the majority of Muslims chose to stay back after partition, a truism reiterated in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.93

Notes and References

  1. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 12–27.
  2. Ibid., p. 11.
  3. Ibid.
  4. B.R. Nanda (2008): Road to Pakistan: The Life and Times of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, New Delhi: Routledge India, pp. 23–24
  5. Ibid., p. 24.

    Also see, Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 33.

  6. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 34.
  7. B.R. Nanda (2008): Road to Pakistan: The Life and Times of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, op. cit., p. 4.
  8. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, Delhi: Oxford University, p. 78.
  9. Sarojini Naidu (1918): Mohd. Ali Jinnah-Ambassador of Unity, Madras: Ganesh and Company. The title was bestowed on him by Sarojini Naidu.
  10. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., p. 84.
  11. Stanley Wolpert(1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 34.
  12. Sarojini Naidu (1918):Mohd. Ali Jinnah-Ambassador of Unity, op. cit., p. 11.
  13. S.S. Pirzada (1982): Foundations of Pakistan, All India Muslim League Documents 1906–1947, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Company, p. 316.
  14. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 35.
  15. Sarojini Naidu (1918): Mohd. Ali Jinnah-Ambassador of Unity, op. cit., p. 45.
  16. Ibid., p. 30.
  17. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 48.
  18. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 97–98.
  19. S.S. Pirzada (1982): Foundations of Pakistan, All India Muslim League Documents 1906–1947, Vol. 1, pp. 371–73.
  20. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 48.
  21. S.S. Pirzada (1982): Foundations of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 354.
  22. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 47–8.
  23. Ibid., p. 55.
  24. Ibid., p. 56.
  25. Ibid., p. 57.
  26. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, New Delhi: Kitab Publishing House, pp. 44–5.
  27. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., p. 176.
  28. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan,op. cit., pp. 71–2.
  29. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., p. 174.
  30. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit. p. 82.
  31. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, op. cit., p. 60.
  32. Ibid., p.74–5.
  33. Ibid., p. 78.
  34. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., p. 92.
  35. M.H. Saiyid (1945): Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Lahore: S.M Ashraf, p. 851.
  36. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim State hood. op. cit., p. 93.
  37. Ibid.
  38. Sarojini Naidu (1918): Mohd. Ali Jinnah-Ambassador of Unity, op. cit., pp. 59–60.
  39. S.S.Pirzada (1982): Foundations of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 577.
  40. B.R. Nanda(1964): Motilal Nehru, Delhi: Publication Division. p. 144.
  41. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 205–08.
  42. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, op. cit., p. 102.
  43. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 246–47.
  44. Ibid., p. 250–63.
  45. Moin Shakir (1986): “Dynamics of Muslim Political Thought”, in Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L. Deutsch(ed), Political Thought in Modern India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, p. 146.
  46. G. Aloysius (1997): Nationalism Without A Nation in India, New Delhi : OUP, p. 218.
  47. Imtiaz Ahmad (2000): “Basic Conflict of We and They Between Religios Traditions”, in Imtiaz Ahmad, Partha S. Ghosh and Helmut Reifeld(ed.), Pluralism and Equality: Values in Indian Society and Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. p. 1168.
  48. Mushirul Hasan (2000): “Majorities and Minorities in Modern South Asian Islam: A Historical Perspective”, in Imtiaz Ahmad, Partha S. Ghosh and Helmut Reifeld(ed.), Pluralism and Equality: Values in Indian Society and Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. p. 146.
  49. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, op. cit., p. 129.
  50. Ibid., p. 131.
  51. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 179–80.
  52. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, op. cit., pp. 146–47.
  53. Ibid., pp. 161–63.
  54. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 289–93.
  55. Jamiluddin Ahmad (1960): Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II, Lahore: Ashraf, pp. 462–63.
  56. Ibid., p. 463.
  57. pakteahouse.wordpress.com/.../text-of-jinnahs-11th-august-speech/
  58. Ibid.
  59. Stanley Wolpert (1984): Jinnah of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 337.
  60. S.S. Pirzada (1969): Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents. Vol. II, p. 425.
  61. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ali_Jinnah
  62. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 465–66.
  63. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, op. cit., pp. 281–82.
  64. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 468–69.
  65. Moin Shakir (1986): “Dynamics of Muslim Political Thought”, in Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L. Deutsch(ed), Political Thought in Modern India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 152–57.
  66. Qouted in Ibid., p. 157.
  67. Quoted in Philip Oldenburg, “Different Faiths, Divided States”, in Ira Pandey (ed), The Great Divide, IIC Quarterly, India International Centre, Vol. 35, No.3 $4,Winter 2008-Spring 2009, p. 70.
  68. Sudipto Kaviraj (1994): “Democracy and Development in India’, in A.K. Bagchi (ed), Democracy and Development, London: Macmillan, p. 123.
  69. Swapan Dasgupta, “A Tale of Two Democracies”, in Ira Pandey(ed.), op. cit., p. 33.
  70. Samuel P. Huntington (1997):The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World order, New Delhi:Viking.
  71. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., p. 335.
  72. Ayesha Jalal (2009): “ Pakistan adores its favourite son but ignores his vision,” Sunday Times of India, August 23.
  73. Saad R. Khairi (1996): The Journey From Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood, op. cit., pp. 302–10.
  74. Ibid., pp. 353–54.
  75. K.M. Munshi (1946): Changing Shape of the Indian Politics, Poona: Deshmukh and Company, p. 116.
  76. Ikram Ali Malik ed. (1990): Muslim League Session 1940 $ The Lahore Resolution Documents, Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, p. 298.
  77. S.S. Pirzada (1969): Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents. Vol. II, Karachi: National Publishing House, pp. 425–26.
  78. S.K. Datta (2002): Pakistan from Jinnah to Jehad, New Delhi: UBSPD, pp. 289–90.
  79. V.P. Verma (1961): Modern Indian Political Thought, Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agrawal, p. 428.
  80. Ajeet Javed (1997): Secular And Nationalist Jinnah, op. cit., pp. 265–66.
  81. Ibid.
  82. Ayesha Jalal (1994): The sole spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. xxvi.
  83. Ibid.
  84. Ashutosh Varshney, “The Idea of Pakistan”, Ira Pandey(ed), The Great Divide, IIC Quarterly, India International Centre, Vol. 35, No. 3 $4,Winter 2008-Spring 2009, p. 10.
  85. Quoted in Moin Shakir (1986): “Dynamics of Muslim Political Thought”, op. cit., p. 155.
  86. Quoted in ibid.
  87. Stephen Jay (1991): Sources of Indian Tradition, New Delhi: Penguin, pp. 238–41.
  88. Benedict Anderson(1983): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso.
  89. Quoted in Ashutosh Varshney, “The Idea of Pakistan”, op. cit., p. 2.
  90. Ibid., p. 3.
  91. T.K. Oommen (2004): Nation, Civil Society and Social Movements: Essays in Political Sociology, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 29–73.
  92. Stephen Cohen (2005): The Idea of Pakistan, New Delhi: OUP.
  93. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Nation_Theory, as accessed on 17th May, 2017 at 11.15 am IST